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Abstract. This work presents a study of the complexity of the Blum-Kalai-Wasserman (BKW) algo-
rithm when applied to the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, by providing refined estimates for
the data and computational effort requirements for solving concrete instances of the LWE problem.
We apply this refined analysis to suggested parameters for various LWE-based cryptographic schemes
from the literature and compare with alternative approaches based on lattice reduction. As a result, we
provide new upper bounds for the concrete hardness of these LWE-based schemes. Rather surprisingly,
it appears that BKW algorithm outperforms known estimates for lattice reduction algorithms starting
in dimension n ≈ 250 when LWE is reduced to SIS. However, this assumes access to an unbounded
number of LWE samples.
1 Introduction
LWE (Learning with Errors) is a generalisation for large moduli of the well-known LPN (Learning Parity
with Noise) problem. It was introduced by Regev in [29] and has provided cryptographers with a remarkably
flexible tool for building cryptosystems. For example, Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan presented in [17]
LWE-based constructions of trapdoor functions and identity-based encryption. Moreover, in his recent semi-
nal work Gentry [16] resolved one of the longest standing open problems in cryptography with a construction
related to LWE: the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme. This was followed by further constructions
of (fully) homomorphic encryption schemes based on the LWE problem, e.g. [5, 11]. Reasons for the popu-
larity of LWE as a cryptographic primitive include its simplicity as well as convincing theoretical arguments
regarding its hardness, namely, a reduction from worst-case lattice problems, such as the (decision) Shortest
Vector Problem (GapSVP) and Short Independent Vectors Problem (SIVP), to average-case LWE [29, 10].
Definition 1 (LWE [29]). Let n, q be positive integers, χ be a probability distribution on Z and s be a secret
vector following the uniform distribution on Znq . We denote by Ls,χ the probability distribution on Znq × Zq
obtained by choosing a from the uniform distribution on Znq , choosing e ∈ Z according to χ, and returning
(a, c) = (a, 〈a, s〉+ e) ∈ Znq × Zq.
– Search-LWE is the problem of finding s ∈ Znq given pairs (ai, ci) ∈ Znq × Zq sampled according to Ls,χ.
– Decision-LWE is the problem of deciding whether pairs (ai, ci) ∈ Znq ×Zq are sampled according to Ls,χ or
the uniform distribution over Znq × Zq.
The modulus q is typically taken to be polynomial in n, and χ is the discrete Gaussian distribution on Z
with mean 0 and standard deviation σ = α · q, for some α.1 For these choices it was shown in [29, 10] that if√
2piσ > 2
√
n, then (worst-case) GapSVP− O˜(n/α) reduces to (average-case) LWE.
Motivation. While there is a reduction of LWE to (assumed) hard lattice problems [29], little is known
about the concrete hardness of particular LWE instances. That is, given particular values for σ, q and n, what
is the computational cost to recover the secret using currently known algorithms? As a consequence of this
gap, most proposals based on LWE do not provide concrete choices for parameters and restrict themselves to
asymptotic statements about security, which can be considered unsatisfactorily vague for practical purposes.
In fact we see this lack of precision as one of the several obstacles to the consideration of LWE-based schemes
for real-world applications.
Previous Work. We may classify algorithms for solving LWE into two families. The first family reduces
LWE to the problem of finding a short vector in the (scaled) dual lattice (commonly known as the Short In-
teger Solution (SIS) problem) constructed from a set of LWE samples. The second family solves the Bounded
Distance Decoding (BDD) problem in the primal lattice. For both families lattice reduction algorithms may
be applied. We may either use lattice reduction to find a short vector in the dual lattice or apply lattice
reduction and (a variant of) Babai’s algorithm to solve BDD [21]. Indeed, the expected complexity of lattice
algorithms is often exclusively considered when parameters for LWE-based schemes are discussed. However,
while the effort on improving lattices algorithms is intense [31, 12, 26, 15, 27, 19, 25, 28], our understanding of
the behaviour of these algorithms in high dimensions is still limited.
On the other hand, combinatorial algorithms for tackling the LWE problem remain rarely investigated from
an algorithmic point of view. For example, the main subject of this paper – the BKW algorithm – specifically
applied to the LWE problem has so far received no treatment in the literature2. However, since the BKW
algorithm can be viewed as an oracle producing short vectors in the dual lattice spanned by the ai (i.e., it
reduces LWE to SIS) it shares some similarities with combinatorial (exact) SVP solvers. Finally, recently
a new algorithm for LWE that reduces the problem to BDD but does not make calls to lattice reduction
algorithms has been proposed: Arora and Ge [7] proposed a new algebraic technique for solving LWE. The
algorithm has a total complexity (time and space) of 2O˜(σ
2) and is thus subexponential when σ ≤ √n,
remaining exponential when σ >
√
n. It is worth noting that Arora and Ge achieve the
√
n hardness-
threshold found by Regev [29], and thus provide a subexponential algorithm precisely in the region where
the reduction to GapSVP fails. We note however that currently the main relevance of Arora-Ge’s algorithm
is asymptotic as the constants hidden in O˜(·) are rather large [3]; it is an open question whether one can
improve its practical efficiency.
Contribution. Firstly, we present a detailed study of a dedicated version of the Blum, Kalai and Wasserman
(BKW) algorithm [9] for LWE with discrete Gaussian noise. The BKW algorithm is known to have (time
and space) complexity 2O(n) when applied to LWE instances with a prime modulus polynomial in n [29]; in
this paper we provide both the leading constant of the exponent in 2O(n) and concrete costs of BKW when
applied to Search- and Decision-LWE. That is, by studying in detail all steps of the BKW algorithm, we ‘de-
asymptotic-ify’ the understanding of the hardness of LWE under the BKW algorithm and provide concrete
values for the expected number of operations for solving instances of the LWE problem. More precisely, we
show the following theorem in Section 3.4.
1 It is common in the literature on LWE to parameterise discrete Gaussian distributions by s = σ
√
2pi instead of σ.
Since we are mainly interested in the “size” of the noise, we deviate from this standard in this work.
2 However, a detailed study of the algorithm to the LPN case was provided [14], which in fact heavily inspired this
work. The authors of [14] conducted a detailed analysis of the BKW algorithm as applied to LPN, while also giving
revised security estimates for some HB-type authentication protocols relying on the hardness of LPN.
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Theorem 1 (Search-LWE, simplified). Let (ai, ci) be samples following Ls,χ, set a = blog2(1/(2α)2)e,
b = n/a and q a prime. Let d be a small constant 0 < d < log2(n). Assume α is such that q
b = qn/a =
qn/blog2(1/(2α)
2)e is superpolynomial in n. Then, given these parameters, the cost of the BKW algorithm to
solve Search-LWE is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)
)
+
⌈
qb
2
⌉
·
(⌈n
d
⌉
+ 1
)
· d · a+ poly(n) ≈ (a2n) · qb
2
operations in Zq. Furthermore,
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+ poly(n) calls to Ls,χ and storage of
(
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
· n
)
elements in Zq are needed.
We note that the above result is a corollary to our main theorem (Theorem 2) which depends on a value
m. However, since at present no closed form expressing m is known, the above simplified statement avoids
m by restricting choices on parameters of the algorithm. We also show the following simple corollary on the
algorithmic hardness of Decision-LWE.
Corollary 1 (Decision-LWE). Let (ai, ci) be samples following Ls,χ, 0 < b ≤ n be a parameter, 0 <  < 1
the targeted success rate and a = dn/be the addition depth. Then, the expected cost of the BKW algorithm
to distinguish Ls,χ from random with success probability  is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
− b
6
(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
))
additions/subtractions in Zq to produce elimination tables,
m ·
(a
2
· (n+ 2)
)
with m = / exp
(
−pi
2σ22a+1
q2
)
additions/subtractions in Zq to produce samples. Furthermore, a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+ m calls to Ls,χ and storage for(
qb
2
)
· a · (n+ 1− ba−12 ) elements in Zq are needed.
This corollary is perhaps the more useful result for cryptographic applications which rely on Decision-LWE
and do not assume a prime modulus q. Here, we investigate the search variant first because the decision
variant follows easily. However, we emphasize that there are noticeable differences in the computational
costs of the two variants. A reader only interested in Decision-LWE is invited to skip Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
In Section 4, we apply the BKW algorithm to various parameter choices for LWE from the literature [29, 21,
5] and compare with alternative approaches in Section 5. It appears that the BKW algorithm outperforms
known estimates for lattice reduction algorithms when LWE is reduced to SIS (called “Distinguishing” in
[21]) starting in dimension n ≈ 250 (but, assuming access to an unbounded number of LWE samples).
However, reducing LWE to BDD (called “Decoding” in [21]) and applying a combination of lattice reduction
and decoding outperforms BKW for the parameter sets considered in this work. However, since the concrete
behaviour of lattice reduction algorithms is not fully understood, the commonly used running-time estimates
tend to be optimistic. In contrast, for combinatorial algorithms such as BKW, we have a much better
understanding of the concrete complexity, leading to greater confidence in the recovered bounds. Finally, we
report experimental results for small instances of LWE in Section 6.
3
2 Preliminaries
Gaussians. Let N (µ, σ2) denote the Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. The LWE
problem considers a discrete Gaussian distribution over Z which is then reduced modulo q. This distribution
in Zq can be obtained by discretising the corresponding wrapped Gaussian distribution over the reals. To
wrap N (0, σ2) mod q, we denote by p(φ) the probability density function determined by σ, define the periodic
variable θ := φ mod q and let
p′(θ) =
∞∑
k=−∞
p(θ + qk) for − q/2 < θ ≤ q/2. (1)
As |k| increases, the contribution of p(θ + qk) falls rapidly; in fact, exponentially fast [13]. Hence, we can
pick a point at which we ‘cut’ p′(θ) and work with this approximation. We denote the distribution sampled
according to p′ and rounded to the nearest integer in the interval ]−q2 ,
q
2 ] by χα,q, where σ = α · q. That is,
Pr[X = x] =
∫ x+ 12
x− 12
p′(t)dt (2)
We note that, in our cases of interest, we can explicitly compute Pr[X = x] because both q and k are poly(n).
We state a straightforward lemma which will be useful in our computations later.
Lemma 1. Let X0, . . . , Xm−1 be independent random variables, with Xi ∼ N (µ, σ2). Then their sum X =∑m−1
i=0 Xi is also normally distributed, with X ∼ N (mµ,mσ2).
In the case of Xi following a discrete Gaussian distribution, it does not necessarily follow that a sum of such
random variables is distributed in a way analogous to the statement above. However, throughout this work,
we assume that this does hold i.e., that Lemma 1 applies to the discrete Gaussian case - while we do not
know how to prove this, this assumption causes no apparent discrepancies in our experimental results. For
a detailed discussion on sums of discrete Gaussian random variables, the interested reader is referred to [1].
Computational Model. We express concrete costs as computational costs and storage requirements. We
measure the former in Zq operations and the latter in the number of Zq elements requiring storage. However,
as the hardness of LWE is related to the quantity n log q [10], relying on these measures would render
results for different instances incommensurable. We hence normalise these magnitudes by considering “bit-
operations” where one ring operation in Zq is equivalent to log2 q such bit operations. The specific multiplier
log2 q is derived from the fact that the majority of operations are additions and subtractions in Zq as opposed
to multiplications in Zq. In particular, we ignore the cost of “book keeping” and of fixed-precision floating
point operations occuring during the algorithm (where the precision is typically a small multiple of n, cf.
Section 4).
We make the assumption that we have unrestricted access to an LWE oracle, allowing us to obtain a large
number of independent LWE samples which may not be available in practise. This assumption is usually made
for combinatorial algorithms and the Arora-Ge algorithm, while lattice reduction algorithms usually require
only a small number of LWE samples. However, as we discuss later, the optimal strategies for employing
lattice based approaches for solving LWE appear to require executing a large number of small-advantage
executions, each requiring independent LWE samples. While the cryptosystems considered in this work do
not provide such an LWE oracle it is known [30] that given roughly n log q LWE samples one can produce
many more LWE samples at the cost of an increase in the noise through inter-addition. While employing
these approaches would render our proofs inapplicable, it is assumed that in practice similar results would
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still hold. Similar notions (in the case of LPN) were considered in [14], although, as in this work, the authors
did not analyse the impact of these steps.
Notation. We always start counting at zero, and denote vectors in bold. Given a vector a, we denote by a(i)
the i-th entry in a, i.e., a scalar, and by a(i,j) the subvector of a spanning the entries at indices i, . . . , j − 1.
When given a list of vectors, we index its elements by subscript, e.g., a0,a1,a2, to denote the first three
vectors of the list. When we write (ai, ci) we always mean the output of an oracle which should be clear from
the context. In particular, (ai, ci) does not necessarily refer to samples following the distribution Ls,χ.
3 The BKW Algorithm
The BKW algorithm was proposed by Blum, Kalai and Wasserman [9] as a method for solving the LPN
problem, with sub-exponential complexity, requiring 2O(n/ logn) samples and time. The algorithm can be
adapted for tackling Search- and Decision-LWE, with complexity 2O(n), when the modulus is taken to be
polynomial in n.
To describe and analyse the BKW algorithm we use terminology and intuitions from linear algebra. Recall
that noise-free linear systems of equations are solved by (a) transforming them into a triangular shape, (b)
recovering a candidate solution in one variable for the univariate linear equation produced and (c) extending
this solution by back substitution. Similarly, if we are only interested in deciding whether a linear system of
equations does have a common solution, the standard technique is to produce a triangular basis and express
other rows as linear combinations of this basis, i.e., to attempt to reduce them to zero.
The BKW algorithm – when applied to Search-LWE – can be viewed as consisting of three stages somewhat
analogous to those of linear system solving:
(a) sample reduction is a form of Gaussian elimination which, instead of treating each component inde-
pendently, considers ‘blocks’ of b components per iteration, where b is a parameter of the algorithm.
(b) hypothesis testing tests candidate sub-solutions to recover components of the secret vector s.
(c) back substitution such that the whole process can be continued on a smaller LWE instance.
On a high-level, to aid intuition, if the standard deviation of χ was zero and hence all equations were noise-
free, we could obviously recover s by simple Gaussian elimination. When we have non-zero noise, however,
the number of row-additions conducted during Gaussian elimination result in the noise being ‘amplified’ to
such levels that recovery of s would generally be impossible. Thus the motivation behind the BKW algorithm
can be thought of as using a greater number of rows but eliminating many variables with single additions
of rows rather than just one. If we can perform a Gaussian elimination-like reduction of the sample matrix
using few enough row additions, the resulting noise in the system is still ‘low enough’ to allow us to recover
one or a few components of s at a time. While, mainly for convenience of analysis, we choose a nested-oracle
approach below to define the algorithm, the above intuitive approach is essentially equivalent.
The way we study the complexity of the BKW algorithm for solving the LWE problem is closely related to the
method described in [14]: given an oracle that returns samples according to the probability distribution Ls,χ,
we use the algorithm’s first stage to construct an oracle returning samples according to another distribution,
which we call Bs,χ,a, where a = dn/be denotes the number of ‘levels’ of addition. The complexity of the
algorithm is related to the number of operations performed in this transformation, to obtain the required
number of samples for hypothesis testing.
We now study the complexity of the first stage of the BKW algorithm.
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3.1 Sample Reduction
Given n ∈ Z, select a positive integer b ≤ n (the window width), and let a := dn/be (the addition depth).
Given an LWE oracle (which by abuse of notation, we will also denote by Ls,χ), we denote by Bs,χ,` a
related oracle which outputs samples where the first b · ` coordinates of each ai are zero, generated under
the distribution (which again by abuse of notation, we denote by Bs,χ,`) obtained as follows:
– if ` = 0, then Bs,χ,0 is simply Ls,χ;
– if 0 < ` < a, the distribution Bs,χ,` is obtained by taking the difference of two vectors from Bs,χ,`−1 that
agree on the elements (a((`−1)·b),a((`−1)·b+1), . . . ,a(`·b−1)).
We can then describe the first stage of the BKW algorithm as the (recursively constructed) series of sample
oracles Bs,χ,`, for 0 ≤ ` < a. Indeed, we define Bs,χ,0 as the oracle which simply returns samples from Ls,χ,
while Bs,χ,` is constructed from Bs,χ,`−1, for ` ≥ 1. We will make use of a set of tables T (maintained across
oracle calls) to store (randomly-chosen) vectors that will be used to reduce samples arising from our oracles.
More explicitly, given a parameter b ≤ n for the window width, and letting a = dn/be, we can describe the
oracle Bs,χ,` as follows:
1. For ` = 0, we can obtain samples from Bs,χ,0 by simply calling the LWE oracle Ls,χ and returning the
output.
2. For ` = 1, we repeatedly query the oracle Bs,χ,0 to obtain (at most) (q
b−1)/2 samples (a, c) with distinct
non-zero vectors for the first b coordinates of a. We only collect (qb−1)/2 such vectors because we exploit
the symmetry of Zq and that of the noise distribution. We use these samples to populate the table T 1,
indexed by the first b entries of a. We store (a, c) in the table. During this course of this population,
whenever we obtain a sample (a′, c′) from Bs,χ,0, if either the first b entries of a′ (resp. their negation)
match the first b entries of a vector a such that the pair (a, c) is already in T 1, we return (a′± a, c′± c),
as a sample from Bs,χ,1. Note that, if the first b entries in a
′ are zero, we return (a′, c′) as a sample from
Bs,χ,1. Further calls to the oracle Bs,χ,1 proceed in a similar manner, but using (and potentially adding
entries to) the same table T 1.
3. For 1 < ` < a, we proceed as above: we make use of the table T ` (constructed by calling Bs,χ,`−1 up
to (qb − 1)/2 times) to reduce any output sample from Bs,χ,`−1 which has the b entries in its `-th block
already in T `, to generate a sample from Bs,χ,`.
Pseudo-code for the oracle Bs,χ,`, for 0 < ` < a, is given in Algorithm 1 (the case ` = a will be discussed
below).
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Input: b – an integer 0 < b ≤ n
Input: ` – an integer 0 < ` < a
begin
T ` ← array indexed by Zbq maintained across all runs of Bs,χ,`;
query Bs,χ,`−1 to obtain (a, c);
if a(b·(`−1),b·`) is all zero vector then
return (a, c);
while T `a(b·(`−1),b·`) = ∅ and T
`
−a(b·(`−1),b·`) = ∅ do
T `a(b·(`−1),b·`) ← (a, c);
query Bs,χ,`−1 to obtain (a, c);
if a(b·(`−1),b·`) is all zero vector then
return (a, c);
if T `a(b·(`−1),b·`) 6= ∅ then
(a′, c′)← T `a(b·(`−1),b·`) ;
return (a− a′, c− c′);
else
(a′, c′)← T `−a(b·(`−1),b·`) ;
return (a + a′, c+ c′);
Algorithm 1: Bs,χ,` for 0 < ` < a
Then, given an LWE oracle Ls,χ outputting samples of the form (a, 〈a, s〉 + e), where a, s ∈ Znq , the oracle
Bs,χ,a−1 can be seen as another LWE oracle outputting samples of the form (a′, 〈a′, s′〉+e′), where a′, s′ ∈ Zkq ,
with k = n mod b, if b does not divide n, or k = b otherwise, and e′ is generated with a different distribution
(related to the original error distribution and the value a). The vector s′ is defined to be the last k components
of s. For the remainder of this section we will assume that n mod b = 0, and therefore k = b (this is done
to simplify the notation, but all the results obtained can be easily adapted when the last block has length
k < b).
We note that, in our analysis below, we make the assumption for simplicity that all tables are completely filled
during the elimination stage of the algorithm, thus giving conservative time and space bounds. In practise,
especially in the final tables, this will not be the case and birthday-paradox arguments could be applied
to derive a more realistic (lower) complexity. Typically, if the number of samples required for hypothesis-
testing is small, the birthday paradox implies that the storage required for the final table can be reduced by
a square-root factor.
Moreover, in this work we introduce an additional parameter d ≤ b which does not exist in the original
BKW algorithm [9]. This parameter is used to reduce the number of hypotheses that need to be tested in
the second stage of the algorithm, and arises from the fact we work with primes q > 2. At times, instead
of working with the last block of length b, which could lead to potentially exponentially many hypotheses
qb to be tested, we may employ a final reduction phase – Bs,χ,a – to reduce the samples to d < b non-zero
entries in a. Thus d will represent the number of components in our final block, i.e., the number of elements
of the secret over which we conduct hypothesis tests. So after running the Bs,χ,a−1 algorithm, we may decide
to split the final block to obtain vectors over Zdq . If so, we run the reduction function described above once
more, which we will denote by Bs,χ,a. In the simple case where we do not split the last block (i.e., d = b),
we adopt the convention that we will also call the Bs,χ,a function, but it will perform no extra action (i.e.,
it simply calls Bs,χ,a−1). Thus we have that for a choice of 0 ≤ d ≤ b, the oracle Bs,χ,a will output samples
of the form (a′, 〈a′, s′〉+ e′), where a′, s′ ∈ Zdq . We pick d = 0 in the decision variant.
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On choosing b and d. In general, as discussed above, choosing the parameter d to be small (e.g. 1 or 2)
leads to the best results. However, in general one could also relax the condition d ≤ b to d ≤ n where d = n
is equivalent to straight-forward exhaustive search. Finally, a natural question is – should all the blocks be
of equal length or should some be shorter than others? Intuitively, choosing blocks which are all of equal size
(or as close as possible) appears to be the optimal strategy, though we do not formally investigate this here.
To ease the presentation, we assume throughout this paper that this is the case.
From the constructions above, it follows that the cost of one call to Bs,χ,` is at most dqb/2e calls to Bs,χ,`−1.
We also need at most one addition of two outputs of Bs,χ,`−1, which have the first b · ` entries in common.
This operation requires n+ 1− b · ` additions in Zq. Furthermore, since we maintain T ` across different runs
of Bs,χ,`, this cost is amortised across different runs of Bs,χ,`. Hence, when ` > 0 the cost of calling Bs,χ,` a
total of m times is upper bounded by:
m+
qb − 1
2
calls to Bs,χ,`−1 and m additions of outputs of Bs,χ,`−1.
Overall we obtain Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let n ≥ 1 be the dimension of the LWE secret vector, q be a positive integer, and d, b ∈ Z with
1 ≤ d ≤ b ≤ n, and define a = dn/be. The cost of calling Bs,χ,a, which returns samples (ai, ci) with at most
the d rightmost entries of ai non-zero, m times is upper bounded by(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
− b
6
(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
))
+m ·
(a
2
· (n+ 2)
)
<
(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)
)
+m · (a
2
· (n+ 2))
additions in Zq and a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+m calls to Ls,χ.
Proof. We may think of the Bs,χ,` oracles as constructing the matrix
B =

T 1
0 . . . 0 T 2
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 T 3
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 T a−1
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 T a
0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 M

where, for 1 ≤ i ≤ a− 1, T i represents a submatrix of (qb− 1)/2 rows and n+ 1− b · (i− 1) columns (the +1
accounts for the ci column). According to our convention, T
a is either a submatrix of (qb−d− 1)/2 rows and
n + 1 − b · (a − 1) columns if we split the last block (i.e. d < b), or an empty matrix. Finally M represents
a submatrix with m rows and d + 1 columns. The matrix B has therefore at most (a − 1) · ((qb − 1)/2) +
((qb−d− 1)/2) +m < a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+m rows and hence needs as many calls to Ls,χ to be constructed. This proves
the second claim.
For the upper-bound on the number of additions necessary in Zq, we have the following (we treat the worst
case, where full construction of all T tables is necessary before obtaining any samples from Bs,χ,a): The
construction of a T -tables is required, only a− 1 (at most) of which require additions.
1. The construction of table T 1 requires 0 ring additions.
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2. The construction of table T 2 requires at most ((qb − 1)/2) · (n+ 1− b) additions.
3. The construction of table T 3 requires at most ((qb − 1)/2) · ((n+ 1− b) + (n+ 1− 2b)) additions.
4. In general, for 2 < i < a, the construction of table T i requires at most(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(i− 1) · (n+ 1)− i−1∑
j=1
j · b
 = (qb − 1
2
)
· (i− 1) ·
(
(n+ 1)− i
2
· b
)
.
5. The construction of T a - the above expression is an upper bound for i = a.
6. Thus, the construction of all the T i tables requires at most(
qb − 1
2
)
·
a∑
j=2
(
(j − 1) · ((n+ 1)− j
2
· b)
)
=
(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)−
a−1∑
k=1
k(k + 1)
2
· b
)
=
(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
− b
6
(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
))
additions in Zq.
7. Now, for the construction of our m final samples, the construction of each of these samples requires at
most
(n+ 1− b) + (n+ 1− 2b) + . . .+ (n+ 1− a · b) =
a∑
i=1
(n+ 1− ib)
< a ·
(
(n+ 1)− n
2
)
=
a
2
· (n+ 2)
additions (in Zq).
8. Thus, the number of additions (in Zq) incurred through calling Bs,χ,a m times is upper-bounded by:(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
− b
6
(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
))
+m ·
(a
2
· (n+ 2)
)
and this concludes the proof of the lemma. uunionsq
The memory requirements for storing the tables T i are established in Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3. Let n ≥ 1 be the dimension of the secret, q be a positive integer, and d, b ∈ Z with 1 ≤ d ≤ b ≤ n,
and define a = dn/be. The memory required to store the table T i is upper bounded by(
qb
2
)
· a ·
(
n+ 1− ba− 1
2
)
Zq elements, each of which requires dlog2(q)e bits of storage.
Proof. The table T 1 has q
b
2 entries each of which holds n + 1 elements of Zq. The table T
2 has the same
number of entries but holds on n+ 1− b elements of Zq. Overall, we get that all tables together hold
a∑
i=1
(
qb
2
)
·
(
n+ 1− (i− 1)b
)
=
(
qb
2
) a∑
i=1
n+ 1− (i− 1)b
=
(
qb
2
)
· a ·
(
n+ 1− ba− 1
2
)
Zq elements. uunionsq
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Note however that, while the original LWE oracle Ls,χ may output zero vectors (which offer no information
for the hypothesis tests in the search variant) with probability q−n, the oracle Bs,χ,a may output such zero
vectors with noticeable probability. In particular, calling Bs,χ,a m times does not guarantee that we get m
samples with non-zero coefficients in ai. The probability of obtaining a zero vector from Bs,χ,a is
1
qd
, and
thus expect to have to call the oracle Bs,χ,a around q
d/(qd − 1) ·m times to obtain ≈ m useful samples with
good probability.
3.2 Hypothesis Testing
To give concrete estimates for the time and data complexity of solving a Search-LWE instance using BKW,
we formulate the problem of solving an LWE instance as the problem of distinguishing between two different
distributions. Assume we have m samples in Zdq × Zq from Bs,χ,a. It follows that we have Zdq hypotheses
to test. In what follows, we examine each hypothesis in turn and derive a hypothesised set of noise values
as a result (each one corresponding to one of the m samples). We show that if we have guessed incorrectly
for the subvector s′ of s then the distribution of these hypothesised noise elements will be (almost) uniform
while if we guess correctly then these hypothesised noise elements will be distributed according to χa. That
is, if we have that the noise distribution associated with samples from Ls,χ is χ = χα,q, then it follows from
Lemmas 1 and 2 that the noise distribution of samples obtained from Bs,χ,` follows χ√2`α,q if all inputs
are independent, i.e., we are adding 2` discrete Gaussians and produce a discrete Gaussian with standard
deviation increased by a factor of
√
2`. For the sake of simplicity, we denote this distribution by χ` in the
remainder of this work and also assume that the oracle Bs,χ,a performs non-trivial operations on the output
of Bs,χ,a−1, i.e., the oracle Bs,χ,a performs a further reduction step. In other words we assume that the
final oracle Bs,χ,a results in a further increase in the standard deviation of the noise distribution associated
with the final samples which are used to test hypotheses for elements of s. We hence make the following
assumption in this section:
Assumption 1 If we let s′ := s(n−d,n) = (s(n−d), . . . , s(n−1)), then the output of Bs,χ,a is generated as
a←$ Zdq , e←$ χa : (a, 〈a, s′〉+ e).
Remark 1. This section only refers to the Search-LWE problem in which we assume q is prime for ease of
analysis and exposition. This restriction does not apply to our results below on the decision variant.
For our hypothesis-testing strategies, we think of each of the samples returned by Bs,χ,a as giving rise to
many equations
fi = −ci ± j +
d−1∑
k=0
(ai)(k)x(k) for 0 ≤ j < q/2.
Given a number of these samples, in order to get an estimate for s′, we run through qd hypotheses and
compute an array of scores S indexed by the possible guesses in Zdq . That is, a function W assigns a weight
to elements in Zq which represent the noise under the hypothesis s′ = v. For each guess v we sum over
the weighted noises W (−ci +
∑d−1
k=0(ai)(k) · v(k)). If W is such that the counter Sv grows proportionally to
the likelihood that v is the correct guess, then the counter Ss′ will grow fastest. Pseudo-code is given in
Algorithm 2.
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Input: F – a set of m samples following Bs,χ,a
Input: W – a weight function mapping members of Zq to real numbers
begin
S ← array filled with zeros indexed by Zdq ;
for v ∈ Zdq do
wv ← ∅;
for fi ∈ F do
write fi as −ci +
∑d−1
k=0(ai)(k) · x(k);
j ← 〈ai,v〉 − ci;
wv ← wv ∪ {W (j)};
Sv ←
∑
wi∈wv wi/m;
return S
Algorithm 2: Analysing candidates.
Lemma 4. Running hypothesis testing costs m · qd operations in Zq.
Proof. Evaluating 〈ai,v〉 − ci at some point in Zdq naively costs 2d operations in Zq which implies an overall
cost of 2d ·m · qd. However, we can reorder the elements in Zdq such that the element at index h differs from
the element at index h + 1 by an addition of a unit vector in Zdq . Evaluating 〈ai,v〉 − ci on all Zdq points
ordered in such a way reduces to one operation in Zq: addition of ai,(j) where j is the index at which two
consecutive elements differ. Hence, Algorithm 2 costs m · qd operations in Zq. uunionsq
Recall that χa is the distribution of the errors under a right guess. Now, let Ua denote the distribution of
errors under a wrong guess v 6= s′. By the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, the most powerful test of whether
samples follow one of two known distributions is the log-likelihood ratio.
Hence, for j, with d−q/2e ≤ j ≤ bq/2c, we set:
W (j) := log2
(
Pr[e←$ χa : e = j]
Pr[e←$ Ua : e = j]
)
. (3)
Next, we establish the relation between p˜j := Pr[e←$ Ua : e = j] and pj := Pr[e←$ χa : e = j].
Lemma 5. Given a wrong guess v for s′, for each element fi = −ci +
∑d−1
k=0(ai)(k)x(k) ∈ Zq[x], with
ci = 〈ai, s′〉 − ei, the probability of error j appearing is
p˜j := Pr[e←$ Ua : e = j] = q
d−1 − pj
qd − 1 (4)
if q is prime.
Proof. We write v = s′ + t. Since v is a wrong guess, we must have t 6= 0. For a fixed s′ and for ai, t 6= 0,
it holds that:
p˜j = Pr[e←$ Ua : e = j] = Pr[〈ai,v〉 − ci = j] = Pr[〈ai, t〉 − ei = j]
=
bq/2c∑
y=d−q/2e
(
Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = y] · Pr[j + ei = y]
)
.
11
This is equal to:
y=−1∑
y=d−q/2e
(
Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = y] · Pr[j + ei = y]
)
+
y=bq/2c∑
y=1
(
Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = y] · Pr[j + ei = y]
)
+ Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = 0] · Pr[ei = −j].
Now, since our q is prime, for any two non-zero elements y, z ∈ Zq, we have that:
Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = y] = Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = z].
We denote this probability by p( 6=0). Conversely, we denote the probability of obtaining 〈ai, t〉 = 0 by p(=0).
Then we clearly have p(6=0) =
1−p(=0)
q−1 . Thus we can write:
p˜j =
p(6=0) y=−1∑
y=d−q/2e
Pr[j + ei = y]
+
p(6=0) y=−1∑
y=d−q/2e
Pr[j + ei = y]

+ Pr[
d−1∑
k=0
ai(k)t(k) = 0] · Pr[ei = −j].
Note that
1− p−j = Pr[ei ←$ χa : ei 6= −j] =
y=−1∑
y=d−q/2e
Pr[j + ei = y] +
bq/2c∑
y=1
Pr[j + ei = y].
By definition, p−j = pj . Thus:
p˜j = p( 6=0) · (1− pj) + p(=0) · pj .
Now, to determine p(=0), the exclusion of zero-vectors from the set of all possible dot products reduces the
number of zero dot products from qd+q2d−1−qd−1 to q2d−1−qd−1−qd+1. Thus we have that the probability
of obtaining a zero dot product is:
p(=0) =
q2d−1 − qd−1 − qd + 1
q2d − 2qd + 1 =
qd−1 − 1
qd − 1 .
Thus, we have:
p˜j = (1− pj) · q
d−1
qd − 1 + pj ·
qd−1 − 1
qd − 1 =
qd−1 − pj
qd − 1
as required. uunionsq
For the final backsubstitution stage, we wish to ensure that the score for the correct guess v = s′ is highest
among the entries of S. Thus, what remains to be established is the size m = |F | needed such that the score
for the right guess v = s′ is the highest. Under our sample independence assumptions, by the Central Limit
theorem, the distribution of Sv approaches a Normal distribution as m increases. Hence, for sufficiently
large m we may approximate the discrete distribution Sv by a normal distribution [8]. If N (µ, σ2) denotes
a Normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ we denote the distribution for v = s′ by
Dc = N (Ec,Varc) and for v 6= s′ by Dw = N (Ew,Varw).
Establishing m hence first of all means establishing Ec,Ew,Varc and Varw. We start with Ec.
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Lemma 6. Let (a0, c0), . . . , (am−1, cm−1) be samples following Bs,χ,a, q be a positive integer, v ∈ Zdq , pj :=
Pr(e←$ χa : e = j), wj := W (j) and Sv = 1m
∑m−1
i=0 W (〈ai,v〉 − ci). When v = s′, E(Sv) is given by:
Ec = E(Sv | v = s′) =
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pjwj = p0w0 + 2 ·
j=bq/2c∑
j=1
pjwj . (5)
Proof. First, we remark that:
Pr[〈ai, s′〉 = ci + u] = Pr[〈ai, s′〉 = 〈ai, s′〉+ ei + u] = Pr[−ei = u] = pu.
The expected value for Sv in the case of a correct guess is then given by:
Ec := E(Sv | v = s′) =
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
Pr[ei = j] ·W (j) =
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pjwj .
Finally, for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ bq/2c, we have p−jw−j = pjwj . Thus:
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pjwj = p0w0 + 2 ·
j=bq/2c∑
j=1
pjwj .
uunionsq
We now examine Ew = E(Sv | v 6= s′). To begin with, we fix a wrong guess v, such that v = s′ + t with
t 6= 0.
Lemma 7. Let (a0, c0), . . . , (am−1, cm−1) be samples following Bs,χ,a, q be a positive integer, v ∈ Zdq , p˜j :=
Pr(e←$ Ua : e = j), pj := Pr(e←$ χa : e = j), wj := W (j), and Sv = 1m
∑m−1
i=0 W (〈ai,v〉 − ci). If v 6= s′,
we have:
Ew = E(Sv | v 6= s′) =
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
p˜jwj =
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
qd−1 − pj
qd − 1 wj . (6)
Since the proof of Lemma 7 is analogous to Lemma 6 we omit it here. We now look at the variances Varc
and Varw.
Lemma 8. Let (a0, c0), . . . , (am−1, cm−1) be samples following Bs,χ,a, q be a positive integer, v ∈ Zdq , pj :=
Pr(e←$ χa : e = j), p˜j := Pr(e←$ Ua : e = j), wj := W (j) and Sv =
∑m−1
i=0
1
mW (〈ai,v〉 − ci).
If v = s′, then
Varc := Var(Sv | v = s′) = 1
m
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pj · (wj − Ec)2. (7)
If v 6= s′, then
Varw := Var(Sv | v 6= s′) = 1
m
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
p˜j · (wj − Ew)2. (8)
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Proof. In the case of v = s′ we have that for m = 1,
Varc =
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pj ·
(
wj − Ec
)2
.
In the case of adding then normalising m samples we can use the fact that when adding random variables of
zero covariance, the sum of the variances is the variance of the sum. Thus the variance in the case of adding
m samples and normalising is given by:
Varc = m ·
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pj ·
(
wj
m
− Ec
m
)2
=
1
m
bq/2c∑
j=d−q/2e
pj · (wj − Ec)2
A similar argument holds in the case of Varw. uunionsq
Finally, given Ec, Ew, Varc, and Varw, we can estimate the rank of the right secret in dependence of the
number of samples m considered. We denote by Yh the random variable determined by the rank of a correct
score Ss′ in a list of h elements. Now, for a list of length q
d and a given rank 0 ≤ r < qd, the probability
of Yqd taking rank r is given by a binomial-normal compound distribution. Finally, we get Lemma 9, which
essentially states that for whatever score the right secret gets, in order for it to have rank zero the remaining
qd − 1 secrets must have smaller scores.
Lemma 9. Let Ec, Ew, Varc and Varw be as in Lemmas 6, 7 and 8. Let also Yqd be the random variable
determined by the rank of a correct score Ss′ in the list S of q
d elements. Then, the number of samples m
required for Yqd to take rank zero with probability 
′ is recovered by solving
′ =
∫
x
[
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
x− Ew√
2Varw
))](qd−1)
·
(
1√
2piVarc
e−
(x−Ec)2
2Varc
)
dx,
for m.
Proof. Yqd follows a binomial-normal compound distribution given by Pr[Yqd = r] =∫
x
((
qd − 1
r
)
· Pr[e←$ Dw : e ≥ x]r · Pr[e←$ Dw : e < x](q
d−r−1) · Pr[e←$ Dc : e = x]
)
dx.
Plugging in r = 0 and Pr[Yqd = r] = 
′ we get:
′ =
∫
x
Pr[e←$ Dw : e < x](q
d−1) · Pr[e←$ Dc : e = x] dx
=
∫
x
[
1
2
(
1 + erf
(
x− Ew√
2Varw
))](qd−1)
·
(
1√
2piVarc
e−
(x−Ec)2
2Varc
)
dx
as required. uunionsq
Using Lemma 9 we can hence estimate the number of non-zero samples m we need to recover subvector s′.
Remark 2. We note that Algorithm 2 not only returns an ordering of the hypotheses but also a score for
each hypothesis. Hence, we can simply sample from Bs,χ,a until the distance between the first and second
highest rated hypothesis is above a certain threshold.
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3.3 Back Substitution
Given a candidate solution for s′ which is correct with very high probability we can perform backsubstitution
in our tables T i similarly to solving a triangular linear system. It is easy to see that backsubstitution costs
2d operations per row. Furthermore, by Lemma 2 we have a · (dqb/2e) rows in all tables T i.
After backsubstitution, we start the BKW algorithm again in stage one where all the tables T i are already
filled. To recover the next d components of s then, we ask for m fresh samples which are reduced using our
modified tables T i and perform hypothesis testing on these m samples.
3.4 Complexity of BKW
We can now state our main theorem.
Theorem 2 (Search-LWE). Let (ai, ci) be samples following Ls,χ, 0 < b ≤ n, d ≤ b parameters, 0 <  < 1
the targeted success rate and q prime. Let a = dn/be and m be as in Lemma 9 when ′ = ()1/dn/de. Then,
the expected cost of the BKW algorithm to recover s with success probability  is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
− b
6
(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
))
(9)
additions/subtractions in Zq to produce the elimination tables,
qd
qd − 1 ·
⌈
n
d
⌉
+ 1
2
·m ·
(a
2
· (n+ 2)
)
(10)
additions/subtractions in Zq to produce samples for hypothesis testing. For the hypothesis-testing step⌈n
d
⌉
· (m · qd) (11)
arithmetic operations in Zq are required and(⌈n
d
⌉
+ 1
)
· d · a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
(12)
operations in Zq for backsubstitution. Furthermore,
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+
qd
qd − 1 ·
⌈n
d
⌉
·m (13)
calls to Ls,χ and storage for (
qb
2
)
· a ·
(
n+ 1− ba− 1
2
)
(14)
elements in Zq are needed.
Proof. In order to recover s we need every run of stage 1 to be successful, hence we have  = (′)dn/de and
consequently ′ = ()1/dn/de.
Furthermore, we have:
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– The cost of constructing the tables T i in Equation (9) follows from Lemma 2.
– Lemma 2 and the fact that with probability 1
qd
the oracle Bs,χ,a returns an all-zero sample establish that
to produce m non-zero samples for hypothesis testing, q
d
qd−1 ·m·
(
a
2 · (n+ 2)
)
operations are necessary. We
need to produce m such samples
⌈
n
d
⌉
times. However, as we proceed the number of required operations
linearly approaches zero. Hence, we need
dnd e+1
2 · q
d
qd−1 ·m ·
(
a
2 · (n+ 2)
)
operations as in Equation (10).
– The cost of Algorithm 2 in Equation (11) which also is run
⌈
n
d
⌉
times follows from Lemma 4.
– There are a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
rows in all tables T i each of which requires 2d operations in backsubstitution. We
need to run backsubstitution
⌈
n
d
⌉
times, but each time the cost decreases linearly. From this follows
Equation (12).
– The number of samples needed in Equation (13) follows from Lemma 2 and that with probability 1
qd−1
the oracle Bs,χ,a returns a sample which is useless to us. uunionsq
– The storage requirement in Equation (14) follows from Lemma 3.
We would like to express the complexity of the BKW algorithm as a function of n, q, α explicitly. In that
regard, Theorem 2 does not deliver yet. However, from the fact that we can distinguish χa and Ua in
subexponential time if the standard deviation
√
2aαq < q/2 (i.e, the standard deviation of the discrete
Gaussian distribution over Z corresponding to χa), we can derive the following simple corollary eliminating
m.
Corollary 2. Let (ai, ci) be samples following Ls,χ, set a = blog2(1/(2α)2)e, b = n/a and q a prime. Let d
be a small constant 0 < d < log2(n). Assume α is such that q
b = qn/a = qn/blog2(1/(2α)
2)e is superpolynomial
in n. Then, given these parameters, the cost of the BKW algorithm to solve Search-LWE is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)
)
+
⌈
qb
2
⌉
·
(⌈n
d
⌉
+ 1
)
· d · a+ poly(n) ≈ (a2n) · qb
2
operations in Zq. Furthermore,
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+ poly(n) calls to Ls,χ and storage of
(
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
· n
)
elements in Zq are needed.
Proof. From the condition
√
2a · α · q < q/2 follows that we must set a = log2(1/(2α)2). If a is set this way
we have that we can distinguish χa from U(Zq) in poly(n). Now, since qb is superpoynomial in n we have
that m ≤ qb and Theorem 2 is dominated by terms involving qb. uunionsq
In many cryptographic applications solving the Decision-LWE problem is equivalent to breaking the crypto-
graphic assumption. Furthermore, in many such constructions q may not be a prime. Hence, we also establish
the cost of distinguishing Ls,χ from random with a given success probability for arbitrary moduli q.
Corollary 3 (Decision-LWE). Let (ai, ci) be samples following Ls,χ, 0 < b ≤ n be a parameter, 0 <  < 1
the targeted success rate and a = dn/be the addition depth. Then, the expected cost of the BKW algorithm
to distinguish Ls,χ from random with success probability  is(
qb − 1
2
)
·
(
a(a− 1)
2
· (n+ 1)− ba(a− 1)
4
− b
6
(
(a− 1)3 + 3
2
(a− 1)2 + 1
2
(a− 1)
))
(15)
additions/subtractions in Zq to produce elimination tables,
m ·
(a
2
· (n+ 2)
)
with m = / exp
(
−pi
2σ22a+1
q2
)
(16)
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additions/subtractions in Zq to produce samples. Furthermore,
a ·
⌈
qb
2
⌉
+m (17)
calls to Ls,χ and storage for (
qb
2
)
· a ·
(
n+ 1− ba− 1
2
)
(18)
elements in Zq are needed.
Proof. No hypothesis testing, backsubstitution and accounting for all zero samples is necessary and hence
any terms referring to those can be dropped from Theorem 2.
Choosing m = exp
(
−pi2σ22a+1q2
)
/ leads to a distinguishing advantage of  (cf. [21]). uunionsq
4 Applications
In this section we apply Theorem 2 to various sets of parameters suggested in the literature. In order to
compute concrete costs we rely on numerical approximations in various places such as the computation of
pj . We used 2n − 4n bits of precision for all computations, increasing this precision further did not appear
to change our results. The solving step for m of Lemma 9 is accomplished by a simple search implemented
in Sage [32]. As a subroutine of this search we rely on numerical integration which we performed using the
mpmath library [20] as shipped with Sage. The Sage script used to derive all values in this section is available
at [4].
In all cases below we always set  = 0.99 and a := dt · log2 nc where t is a small constant, which is consistent
with the complexity of the BKW algorithm qO(n/ log2(n)) = 2O(n) if q ∈ poly(n).
4.1 Regev’s Original Parameters
In [29] Regev proposes a simple public-key encryption scheme with the suggested parameters q ≈ n2 and
α = 1/(
√
n · log22 n
√
2pi). We consider the parameters in the range n = 32, . . . , 256. In our experiments t = 3.0
produced the best results, i.e., higher values of t resulted in m growing too fast. Plugging these values into
the formulas of Theorem 2 we get an overall complexity of
mn9 + 16 2
2
3nn5 +
[(
3n+ 92
) · (2 23nn4 + 1)] log2 (n)2 + 16 n
2 (n4 − 1)
operations in Zq after simplification. If m < 2(
2
2.6n)) then this expression is dominated by
1
6n
5 +
(
3n5 + 92n
4
) · log2 (n)2
2 (n4 − 1) 2
2
3n ∈ 2 23n+O(logn).
However, since we compute m numerically, we have to rely concrete values for various n to verify that
with these settings indeed m does not grow too fast. Table 1 lists the estimated number of calls to Ls,χ
(“log2 #Ls,χ”), the estimated number of required ring (“log2 #Zq”) and bit (“log2 #Z2”) operations, the costs
in terms of ring operations for each of the three stages sampling, hypothesis testing and back substitution.
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n log2m log2 #Zq in log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ
sample hypo. subs. total
32 19.93 32.76 34.94 29.31 35.25 38.57 25.64
48 28.90 43.70 45.66 40.69 46.02 49.50 35.81
64 34.22 54.36 52.22 51.86 54.85 58.43 45.87
80 42.19 65.50 61.16 62.94 65.78 69.44 56.60
96 49.83 76.52 69.58 73.91 76.75 80.47 67.31
112 58.79 87.51 79.22 84.84 87.72 91.49 78.02
128 67.44 98.46 88.44 95.75 98.67 102.48 88.74
144 76.40 109.35 97.91 106.61 109.56 113.40 99.43
160 86.37 120.23 108.34 117.46 120.43 124.30 110.12
176 97.34 131.09 119.71 128.29 131.28 135.18 120.82
192 106.30 141.93 129.06 139.10 142.12 146.04 131.51
208 117.27 152.76 140.37 149.91 152.95 156.89 142.20
224 128.56 163.57 151.98 160.70 163.76 167.72 152.88
240 139.52 174.37 163.24 171.48 174.56 178.54 163.57
256 150.49 185.17 174.49 182.26 185.35 189.35 174.25
Table 1. Cost of solving Search-LWE for parameters suggested in [29] with d = 1, t = 3,  = 0.99 with BKW.
4.2 Lindner and Peikert’s Parameters
In [21], Lindner and Peikert propose new attacks and parameters for LWE. Table 2 lists concrete costs of
the BKW algorithm for solving LWE under the parameter choices from [21] as interpreted in [6]. In our
computations t = 2.7 produced the best results, i.e., higher values of t resulted in m growing too fast.
n log2m log2 #Zq in log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ
sample hypo. subs. total
32 7.64 35.91 33.65 33.92 36.46 39.78 28.84
48 9.97 45.75 36.56 43.58 46.04 49.52 37.94
64 15.61 54.82 42.62 52.53 55.09 58.67 46.49
80 22.25 63.39 49.58 61.02 63.65 67.31 54.66
96 30.90 71.62 58.49 69.18 71.86 75.58 62.57
112 40.86 79.57 68.68 77.08 79.81 83.58 70.25
128 54.15 87.32 82.16 84.78 87.58 91.39 77.76
144 37.54 102.31 67.71 99.73 102.53 106.37 92.54
160 46.51 110.38 76.83 107.77 110.60 114.47 100.43
176 56.47 118.31 86.93 115.68 118.53 122.43 108.20
192 70.76 126.13 101.35 123.47 126.34 130.26 115.87
208 80.73 133.84 111.43 131.15 134.05 137.99 123.44
224 94.34 141.45 125.15 138.74 141.66 145.62 130.92
240 109.62 148.98 140.53 146.25 149.18 153.16 138.33
256 126.23 156.42 157.24 153.68 157.96 161.96 145.67
Table 2. Cost of solving Search-LWE for parameters suggested in [21] with d = 1, t = 2.7,  = 0.99 with BKW.
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4.3 Albrecht et al.’s Polly-Cracker
In [5] a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme is proposed based on the hardness of computing Gro¨bner
bases with noise. Using linearisation the equation systems considered in [5] may be considered as LWE
instances. Table 3 lists concrete costs for recovering the secret Gro¨bner basis using this strategy for selected
parameters suggested in [5]. In Table 3 “λ” is the targeted bit-security level and n the number of variables
in the linearised system. We note that we did not exploit the structure of the secret for Table 3.
λ n q α t log2m log2 #Zq in log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ
sample hypo. subs. total
80 136 1999 0.005582542. . . 2.2 93.58 109.40 121.59 105.71 121.59 125.04 100.23
231 92893 0.000139563. . . 3.4 127.23 157.47 167.09 154.40 167.09 171.13 146.54
128 153 12227 0.002797408. . . 2.4 84.05 132.07 117.45 129.66 132.32 136.08 122.39
253 594397 0.000034967. . . 3.8 100.66 175.15 146.00 171.88 175.29 179.55 163.89
Table 3. Cost of finding G ≈ s for parameters suggested in [5] with d = 2,  = 0.99.
5 Comparison with Alternative Approaches
Now, given the complexity estimates in Section 4 we may ask how these relate to existing approaches in the
literature. Hence, we briefly describe some alternative strategies for solving the LWE problem.
5.1 Short Integer Solutions: Lattice Reduction
In [24], the authors briefly examine an approach for solving LWE by distinguishing between valid matrix-
LWE samples of the form (A, c) = (A,As + e) and samples drawn from the uniform distribution over
Zm×nq × Znq . Given a matrix of samples A, one way of constructing such a distinguisher is to find a short
vector u in the dual lattice Λ(A)⊥ such that uA = 0 mod q. If c belongs to the uniform distribution
over Znq , then 〈u, c〉 belongs to the uniform distribution on Zq. On the other hand, if c = As + e, then
〈u, c〉 = 〈u,As + e〉 = 〈u, e〉, where samples of the form 〈u, ei〉 are governed by another discrete, wrapped
Gaussian distribution. Following the work of Micciancio and Regev [24], the authors of [21] give estimates
for the complexity of distinguishing between LWE samples and uniform samples by estimating the cost of
the BKZ algorithm in finding a short enough vector. In particular, given n, q, σ = αq, We set s = σ · √2pi
and compute β = q/s ·√log(1/)/pi. From this β we then compute the required root Hermite factor δ =
2log
2
2(β)/(4n log2 q). Note that this presupposes access to m =
√
n log2 q/ log2 δ samples; an assumption which
holds in our setting. Given δ we then extrapolate the running time in seconds as log2 Tsec = 1.8/ log2 δ− 110
as in [21]. We translate this figure into bit operations by assuming 2.3 · 109 bit operations per second on a
2.3 GHz CPU. Furthermore, we note that for BKZ picking  1 and running the algorithms about 1/ times
is usually more efficient than picking  ≈ 1 directly. Table 4 compares the number of bit and ring operations
using the BKW and BKZ algorithm as described in [21]. In Table 4 running times and the number of required
samples for BKZ include the 1/ factor, hence both approaches distinguish with probability close to 1.
Hence, Table 4 illustrates that for the families of parameters considered here, we expect the BKW algorithm
to be asymptotically faster than the BKZ algorithm with a crossover around n = 250 at the cost of requiring
a lot more samples and memory.
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n q αq BKW NTL-BKZ Lindner/Peikert Model
t log2m log2 #Zq log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ log2  log2m log2 #Zq log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ
Regev [29]
128 16411 11.81 3.2 81.62 93.84 97.65 83.85 -18 26.47 61.56 65.36 26.47
256 65537 25.53 3.1 126.26 179.76 183.76 168.79 -29 38.50 175.48 179.48 38.50
512 262147 57.06 3.1 337.92 350.80 354.97 338.02 -48 58.52 386.75 390.92 58.52
Lindner & Peikert [21]
128 2053 2.70 2.9 63.86 82.40 85.86 72.73 -18 26.25 54.50 57.96 26.25
256 4099 3.34 2.8 105.08 151.45 155.04 140.64 -29 38.22 156.18 159.77 38.22
512 4099 2.90 2.6 157.78 278.01 281.59 266.14 -50 60.14 341.87 345.45 60.14
Table 4. Cost of solving Decision-LWE with BKZ as in [21] and BKW as in Corollary 3.
In [12] the authors present a study of ‘BKZ 2.0’, the amalgamation of three folklore techniques to improve
the performance of BKZ: pruned enumeration; pre-processing of local blocks and early termination. While
no implementations of such algorithms are publicly available, the authors of [12] present a simulator to
predict the behaviour of out-of-reach BKZ algorithms. However, the accuracy of this simulator has not been
independently verified. In a recent work [22], the authors re-visit the BKZ running-time model of [21] and
compare the predictions to the simulator of [12] in a few cases. In the cases examined in [22], the running-time
predictions obtained by the use of the BKZ 2.0 simulator are quite close to those obtained by the model of
Lindner and Peikert.
Based on the data-points provided in [22] and converting these to the same metric as in the Lindner-Peikert
model, the function
log2 T
BKZ2.0
sec = 0.009/ log
2
2 δ0 − 27
provides a very close approximation to the running-time output of the simulator for this particular case (cf.
Figure 1).
This is a non-linear approximation and hence naturally grows faster than the approximation in [21]. This
does not imply that the BKZ 2.0 algorithm is slower than the variant implemented in NTL, as these are two
different estimates for the same algorithm (the extrapolation of [21] aimed to take into account the advances
collectively known as BKZ 2.0). However, given the greater sophistication of the latter “BKZ 2” extrapola-
tions derived from the simulator of [12], we expect this model to provide more accurate approximations of
running times than the model of [21].
In particular, a BKZ logarithmic running-time model which is non-linear in log2(δ0) appears more intuitive
than a linear model. While, in practise, the root Hermite factors achievable through the use of BKZ with
a particular blocksize β are much better than their best provable upper bounds, the root factor achievable
appears to behave similarly to the upper bounds as a function of β. Namely, the best proven upper bounds
on the root Hermite factor are of the form
√
γβ
1/(β−1), where γβ denotes the best known upper bound on
the Hermite constant for lattices of dimension β. Now since, asymptotically, γβ grows linearly in β, if we
assume that the root Hermite factor achievable in practise displays asymptotic behaviour similar to that of
the best-known upper bound, then the root Hermite factor achievable as a function of β, denoted δ0(β), is
such that δ0(β) ∈ Ω(1/β). Since the running time of BKZ appears to be doubly-exponential in β, we can
derive that log Tsec is non-linear in 1/ log(δ0), as is borne out by the results in [22]. We also note that in [21]
the assumption is made that log Tsec = O(1/ log(δ0)), which does not hold from the above discussion.
Using this model, we can give an analogue of Table 4 in which the BKZ entries are obtained using the above
approximate model.
Thus, we can reasonably conclude that, under the assumptions made above, employing lattice reduction in
a pure distinguishing approach is out-performed by BKW in surprisingly low dimension.
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Fig. 1. BKZ running times in seconds s for given values of δ0.
n q αq BKW BKZ 2.0 Simulator Model
t log2m log2 #Zq log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ log2  log2m log2 #Zq log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ
Regev [29]
128 16411 11.81 3.2 81.62 93.84 97.65 83.85 -14 22.50 61.90 65.71 22.50
256 65537 25.53 3.1 126.26 179.76 183.76 168.79 -35 44.48 174.46 178.46 44.48
512 262147 57.06 3.1 337.92 350.80 354.97 338.02 -94 104.47 518.62 522.79 104.47
Lindner & Peikert [21]
128 2053 2.70 2.9 63.86 82.40 85.86 72.73 -14 22.28 57.06 60.52 22.28
256 4099 3.34 2.8 105.08 151.45 155.04 140.64 -33 42.21 151.16 154.74 42.21
512 4099 2.90 2.6 157.78 278.01 281.59 266.14 -86 96.09 424.45 428.03 96.09
Table 5. Cost of distinguishing LWE samples from uniform as reported as “Distinguish” in [21], compared to
Corollary 3. BKZ estimates obtained using BKZ 2.0 simulator-derived cost estimate.
5.2 Short Integer Solutions: Combinatorial
Recall that if we consider the set of samples from Ls,χ used during the course of the BKW algorithm as
determining a q-ary lattice, and the noisy vector as denoting a point close to a lattice point, we may consider
the BKW algorithm as analysed in Corollary 3 as a combinatorial approach for sampling a sparse u in the
dual lattice with entries ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Hence, it is related to a combinatorial approach for finding short dual-
(q-ary)lattice vectors as briefly sketched in [24, p. 156] (cf. also [23]). These algorithms, however, operate
somewhat differently to BKW - given a relatively small set of LWE samples, these are divided into a small
number of subsets. Within each subset, we compute all linear combinations of the members of that subset
such that the coefficients of these linear combinations are in {−b′, . . . , b′} (note that the parameter b′ is
unrelated to the parameter b used in this work).
The algorithm sketched by [24] uses the generalised birthday paradox to produce collisions among samples
produced by inter-addition, with the parameters of the algorithm being chosen such that we expect to obtain
a single short vector in the dual-lattice vector.
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There are some significant differences between such algorithms and BKW, stemming from the assumption of
the former that we only have access to a very small number of LWE samples. This requires the ‘expansion’ of
the sample set in such a way that when we search for collisions, we are almost certain to find enough. On the
other hand, due to this expansion, the initial samples must be separated into disjoint lists. Thus, probably
the easiest way to describe the algorithm in [24] in terms of BKW is to imagine a variant of BKW where,
if a sample is not in a given table, we add this sample plus all {−b, . . . , b}-bounded linear combinations of
this sample with the pre-existing table entries, to the table. To give a strict analogue to [24], on finding a
subsequent collision, we would need to store a list of all noise elements which had been added to a sample
and ensure that, if we want to eliminate a sample, that the set of noise elements belonging to the sample
and the set of noise elements belonging to the table entry are disjoint.
However, the fundamental difference stems from the assumption that the number of samples is restricted. If
this is not the case (as we assume), then it is clear that BKW delivers a much shorter dual lattice vector.
5.3 Bounded Distance Decoding: Lattice Reduction
In [21], the authors propose a method to solve LWE instances which consists of q-ary lattice reduction, then
employing a decoding stage to determine the secret. The decoding stage used is essentially a straightforward
modification of Babai’s well-known nearest plane algorithm for CVP. The authors estimate the running-time
of the BKZ algorithm in producing a basis ‘reduced-enough’ for the decoding stage of the algorithm to
succeed, then add the cost of the decoding stage.
To obtain comparable complexity results, we calculate upper bounds on the bit operation counts for two
data-points based on the running times reported in [21] multiplied by the clock speed of the CPU used.
As can be seen from Table 6, unsurprisingly these indicate substantially lower complexities than for BKW.
In addition, the memory requirements of this approach are small compared to the memory requirements of
BKW.
n q αq BKW NTL-BKZ Lindner/Peikert Model
t log2m log2 #Zq log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ log2  log2m log2 #Zq log2 #Z2 log2 #Ls,χ
136 2003 5.19 2.6 67.49 93.77 97.23 84.15 -25 33.46 91.35 94.81 33.46
214 16381 2.94 3.4 76.90 128.36 132.16 117.54 -18 26.95 82.31 86.11 26.95
Table 6. Cost of solving Search-LWE reported as “Decode” in [21], compared to the cost solving Decision-LWE with
BKW
5.4 Bounded Distance Decoding: Combinatorial
We can take the approach of viewing LWE as being the problem of solving BDD in a random q-ary lattice
with a random target t = As + e. To solve the LWE problem formulated thus, we have several choices of
lattice-based algorithms. However, for several such algorithms, tight complexity estimates are unavailable,
thus making comparison to BKW loose. One algorithm for which more precise complexity estimates are
available is the AKS (Ajtai, Kumar & Sivakumar) algorithm for solving the shortest vector problem [2]. This
algorithm is notable as being the first proposed singly-exponential SVP algorithm.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to give details of the AKS algorithm – we are interested solely in the
complexity. In the original paper by Ajtai, Kumar & Sivakumar, no explicit running-time bound was given.
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Subsequent developments of the AKS algorithm by Regev, Nguyen and Vidick, Micciancio and Voulgaris,
Pujol and Stehle delivered algorithms which were of time complexity 216n+o(n), 25.9n+o(n), 23.4n+o(n) and
22.7n+o(n), respectively [18].
6 Experimental Results
In order to verify the results of this work, we implemented stages 1 and 2 of the BKW algorithm. Our
implementation considers LWE with short secrets but we ignore the transformation cost to produce samples
with a short secret. Also, our implementation supports arbitrary bit-width windows b, not only multiplies of
dlog2(q)e. However, due to the fact that our implementation does not use a balanced representation of finite
field elements internally – which simplifies dealing with arbitrary bit-width windows – our implementation
does not fully implement the half-table improvement. That is, for simplicity, our implementation only uses the
additive inverse of a vector if this is trivially compatible with our internal data representation. Furthermore,
our implementation does not bit-pack finite field elements. Elements always take up 16 bits of storage. Overall,
the memory consumption of our implementation in stage 1 is worse by a factor of up to four compared to the
estimates given in this work and the computational work in stage is worse by a factor of up to two. Finally,
since our implementation is not optimised we do not report CPU times.
With these considerations in mind, our estimates are confirmed by our implementation. For example, consider
Regev’s parameters for n = 25 and t = 2.3 and d = 1, By Lemma 9 picking m = 212.82 will result in a
success probability of psuccess ≈ 0.99959 per component and Psuccess ≈ 0.99 overall. Lemma 2 estimates a
computational cost of 230.54 ring operation and 224.19 calls to Ls,χ in stage 1. We ran our implementation
with m = d212.82c and window bitsize w = 22 = n log2(q)2.3 log2(n) . It required 2
29.74 ring operations and 223.31 calls
to Ls,χ to recover one component of s. From this we conclude that Theorem 2 is reasonably tight.
To test the accuracy of Lemma 9 we ran our implementation with the parameters n = 25, q = 631, α·q = 5.85,
w = 24 = n log2(q)2.1 log2(n)
and m = 27. Lemma 9 predicts a success rate of 53%. In 1000 experiments we 665 times
rank zero for the correct key component, while Lemma 9 predicted 530. Hence, it seems our predictions
are slightly pessimistic. The distribution of the ranks of the correct component of s in 1000 experiments is
plotted in Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Distribution of right key component ranks for 1000 experiments on n = 25, t = 2.3, d = 1, psuccess = 0.99.
Our implementation is available at http://bitbucket.org/malb/bkw-lwe.
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7 Conclusion and Further Work
In this work we have provided a concrete analysis of the cost of running the BKW algorithm on LWE instances
both for the search and the decision variants of the LWE problem. We also applied this analysis to various
sets of parameters found in the literature. From this we conclude that the BKW algorithm outperforms
lattice reduction algorithms in an SIS setting for the parameter sets proposed in [29, 21] starting around
dimension n ≈ 250 at the cost of requiring many more samples and storage. On the other hand, lattice
reduction in a BDD setting currently outperforms the BKW algorithm as analysed in this work.
A pressing research question for future work is hence how to apply a variant of the BKW algorithm to
the BDD problem. Furthermore, in this work we ignore the so-called LWE “normal form” where the secret
follows the noise distribution χ (cf. [10]) and other small secret variants of LWE. For the BKW algorithm
as presented in this work, only hypothesis testing is affected by the size of the secret and hence we do
not expect the algorithm to benefit from considering small secrets. Yet, a dedicated variant of the BKW
algorithm tackling small secrets is a promising research direction.
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